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GROWING THROUGH TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS: 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN GROWTH AND DOMESTIC TARIFFS 
ABSTRACT 
We show that pure Ricardian trade can account for the empirical evidence that 
domestic growth is more affected by foreign growth than by trade openness. To do this, 
we develop a two-country model involving a backward economy that exchanges 
intermediate goods with a faster growing country. We obtain three main results 
regarding growth and welfare of the backward economy: (i) the growth-enhancing 
comparative advantage is facilitated by faster foreign growth; (ii) the growth rate may 
be negatively affected or unaffected by a domestic tariff, while it is always positively 
impacted by foreign growth; (iii) a domestic tariff could be welfare-improving. 
JEL classification: F10, O24, O41 





Despite the profusion of studies on the connection between trade and economic growth, 
no conclusive results have been obtained on this linkage (e.g. Rodríguez and Rodrik, 
2001; Singh, 2010). However, some empirical literature indicates that domestic features 
are not the only ones playing a role, but also foreign conditions. Indeed, the econometric 
findings in Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) reveal that the growth rate of trading partners 
has a greater impact on domestic growth than trade openness does. More specifically, 
they divided countries into closed and open ones, according to Sachs and Warner’s 
(1995) definition, and in both cases found that a country’s growth is positively affected 
by their trading partners’ growth rates. While empirical studies have found a positive 
linkage between domestic and foreign growth (e.g. Easterly, 2001; Calderón, Loayza 
and Schmidth-Hebbel, 2006; Arora and Vamvakidis, 2006, 2011), the findings 
regarding the relationship between trade policy and growth are mixed (e.g. Rodríguez 
and Rodrik, 2001; Yanikkaya, 2003; Clements and Williamson, 2004; DeJong and 
Ripoll 2006; Madsen, 2009). Any explanation of these empirical results needs an 
approach that focuses “on how much economic conditions in trading partners matter for 
growth” (Arora and Vamvakidis, 2005, p. 27), as well as how much trade openness 
matters for growth. 
In this paper, we adopt this approach to show that pure Ricardian trade can account 
for the aforementioned empirical evidence. As argued by Yenokyan, Seater and 
Arabshahi (2014), a pure Ricardian approach is valuable for the study of the trade-
growth linkage, since the empirical results regarding the significance of scale 
economies are mixed (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe, 1992; Hanson and Xiang, 2004; 
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Head and Mayer, 2004), and international spillovers, though empirically relevant (e.g. 
Liu and Buck, 2007; Keller, 2010), cannot be considered as a trade mechanism. 
Thus, this paper builds on Ventura’s (1997) model and develops a theoretical 
framework with two technologically different countries: a backward economy (country 
B) that may boost its growth rate simply by exchanging intermediate goods with a faster 
growing country (country P). It should be highlighted that our model considers trade in 
intermediate goods because it represents the largest share of world trade flows and also 
has a greater productivity impact than trade in final goods. Indeed, as reported by 
Miroudot, Lanz and Ragoussis (2009, p. 48), for OECD countries, trade in intermediate 
inputs represents 56.2% (in 2006) and 73.19% (in 2005) of trade flows of goods and 
services, respectively.1 Moreover, empirical evidence by Amiti and Konings (2007) 
shows that the productivity gains from reducing tariffs on intermediate goods are at 
least twice as high as the gains from reducing tariffs on final goods. These authors state 
that the access to cheaper intermediate inputs in international markets can raise 
productivity via variety, quality and learning effects. 
In our model, we assume that country P grows at an exogenous rate, while for 
country B trade becomes the only possibility of achieving faster growth in the long-run 
by boosting investment in physical capital. Thus, our framework captures the empirical 
result that trade affects growth mainly via capital investment (e.g. Levine and Renelt, 
1992; Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996; Wacziarg, 2001; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). In 
this context, we consider an import tariff established by country B that can never be 
growth-enhancing. In the theoretical literature on this topic, the positive relationship 
                                                 
1 The figures for the emerging economies of Brazil, China and India are 72.7% and 67.14%, 75.3% 
and 86.99%, 79.5% and 47.85%, respectively. 
3 
 
between tariffs and growth relies on scale economies and international spillovers (e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Lee, 2011). 
Countries B and P produce a non-traded final good with two traded intermediate 
inputs, goods x  and z . In the same vein as Yenokyan et al. (2014), final good 
technologies in countries may differ in input shares, reflecting different input intensities. 
This assumption allows any growth outcome in country B, ranging from autarky growth 
to convergence in growth rate with the trading partner. The production of intermediate 
goods uses capital and labor. In sector x  there is exogenous labor-augmenting 
technological progress, with productivity gains being greater in country P than in 
country B.2 The countries have the same AK technology in sector z , which is the result 
of an external learning-by-doing (LBD) process à la Arrow (1962). We analyze the 
long-run equilibrium, and also perform numerical exercises to evaluate the temporary 
tariff impacts on growth and welfare. 
The comparative advantages of countries in the long-run rely on exogenous 
productivity gains in sector x  and input intensities in the final good sector. Since 
relative prices reflect the relative scarcity of intermediate goods, identical input shares 
in countries would result in country P (country B) having comparative advantage in 
good x  (good z ). However, comparative advantages may reverse when country P is 
less intensive in good x  than country B. 
We show that to benefit from trade in terms of faster growth, country B must get rid 
of sector x  and be specialized in sector z , the one with learning opportunities (Young, 
                                                 
2 Empirical evidence has documented differences in sectoral total factor productivity between 
countries (e.g. Fadinger and Fleiss, 2011). 
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1991; Reeding, 1999).3 This is clearly a direct outcome of our technology specification 
for sectors x  and z . Since both countries have the same technology for good z , the 
backward economy can boost its growth by “using” the more efficient technology of 
good x  in country P. Notably, we obtain that the growth-enhancing comparative 
advantage is facilitated by faster growth in country P. Otherwise, country B would not 
benefit from foreign productivity gains, so its long-run growth rate remains unchanged. 
It is worth noting that our technology specification for intermediate goods is 
mathematically convenient for two reasons. First, country P always grows at the same 
constant rate, which is useful for comparative statics and, second, the growth rate of 
country B is endogenously determined by trade relationships and policy. However, our 
specification is also empirically sensible, since it can deliver the findings in Trefler 
(1993) regarding the Leontief paradox (Leontief, 1953). More specifically, Trefler 
(1993) shows that the US –an advanced economy– “was labor abundant as measured in 
productivity equivalent workers” (p. 962), so this country exports goods with a high 
content in productivity-adjusted labor and imports goods with a high capital content. In 
our model, the growth-enhancing comparative advantage agrees with this empirical 
evidence. 
Thus, faster growth emerges in country B because of specialization and more 
favorable relative prices than in autarky, which raises the interest rate and hence the 
growth rate. However, an import tariff may be growth-impairing, since it introduces a 
                                                 
3 Literature has shown that the specialization in sectors with higher learning opportunities fosters 
long-run growth, and vice versa. Moreover, the presence of dynamic productivity gains linked to 
externalities may result in a “wrong” specialization pattern, since the comparative advantage in a 
particular period depends on the knowledge accumulated until then. In our analysis, we discard this 
possibility by assuming that countries specialize according to their long-run comparative advantage. 
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wedge between international and domestic relative prices. When country B has the 
growth-enhancing comparative advantage, the trade equilibrium can be characterized by 
either complete or incomplete specialization of country P, while the backward economy 
only produces good z . 
Under incomplete specialization, country B eventually faces the more favorable 
autarky price of the trading partner. Nonetheless, the backward economy cannot reach 
the partner’s growth rate as long as both countries have an AK technology in sector z , 
which prevents the equalization of interest rates. Moreover, the growth rate of country B 
is affected positively by foreign growth and negatively by a domestic import tariff. 
Even so, we can establish a sufficient condition on the input intensities for the foreign 
growth effect to outweigh the tariff effect. 
Complete specialization allows the equalization of interest rates and hence of growth 
rates. The reason lies in the combination of an AK technology in sector z  and a Cobb-
Douglas technology in sector x , so country P’s capital stock can be adjusted to allow 
convergence. Owing to the AK technology in sector z , the domestic relative price of 
country B does not depend on the import tariff, so there could be room for placing the 
international relative price of good z  above the one arising under free trade. 
Consequently, faster growth in country P always increases the growth rate of country B, 
but changes in the import tariff have no impact on domestic growth. 
Moreover, under complete specialization there might be a rationale for setting a 
tariff, since the policy could be welfare-improving for the backward economy. This 
possibility arises when the tariff has a slight impact on the capital accumulation of 
country P, which occurs when this economy is highly intensive in good x . Nonetheless, 
we show that although a tariff does not affect long-run growth, it causes temporary 
growth reductions in both countries because of lower capital accumulation. 
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Our model belongs to the rather scarce literature in which the impacts of trade on 
long-run growth operate solely via comparative advantage and specialization, and the 
countries exchange increasing amounts of goods at constant terms of trade. Manresa and 
Pigem-Vigo (1999) and Álvarez-Albelo, Manresa and Pigem-Vigo (2009) showed that a 
stagnated economy can converge in growth rate solely by trading in intermediate goods 
with a growing economy. However, their models involve the same technology to 
accumulate capital in countries. With a multi-country model of AK economies, 
Acemoğlu and Ventura (2002) found that trade and specialization yield convergence in 
growth rates even in the absence of decreasing returns. Yenokyan et al. (2014) built a 
two-country model with different factor intensities in technologies. They showed that 
trade in factors of production can result in either faster growth and convergence in 
growth rates –under complete specialization– or in uneven growth –under incomplete 
specialization–. Ji and Seater (2014) developed a model involving R&D and 
endogenous market structures that can deliver any kind of growth outcome in countries. 
However, their model does not include capital accumulation. 
Our work is also related to the literature on tariff effects on growth and welfare. 
Osang and Pereira (1996) studied these effects with a model of human capital 
accumulation representing a small open economy. They found that most tariffs reduce 
growth, but a revenue-neutral tariff reform4 may enhance welfare and long-run growth. 
Osang and Turnovsky (2000) obtained the same result using a similar framework, but 
including LBD, endogenous labor supply and access restrictions to international capital 
markets. Using a framework of a small open economy and LBD, Naito (2006) obtained 
growth and welfare increases with a combination of a consumer-price-neutral tariff, a 
                                                 




growth-enhancing tax reform and a tax increase on the less distorted good. By contrast, 
our work is not just concerned with studying the effects of a tariff on growth and 
welfare, but with offering an explanation based on pure Ricardian trade of the empirical 
evidence by Arora and Vamvakidis (2005). To achieve this aim, we develop a two-
country model where faster long-run growth may only emerge from trade and never 
from an import tariff. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 solves the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 shows the role of comparative 
advantage for growing through trade. Section 5 identifies the conditions for country B 
to have the growth-enhancing comparative advantage, and analyzes the trade 
equilibrium in the long-run. Section 6 studies the impacts of foreign growth and an 
import tariff on domestic growth. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
II THE MODEL 
The model involves two technologically different countries: country B, a backward 
economy that may increase its long-run growth rate simply by trading with a faster 
growing partner, country P. In an autarky situation, they grow at the exogenous rates iθ , 
,i B P= , with 0 B Pθ θ≤ < . In this context, the countries engage in trade relationships 
according to their long-run comparative advantages, which might only affect the growth 
potential of the backward economy. In addition, country B sets an import tariff that can 
never be growth-enhancing. 
In each period, [ )t 0,∈ ∞ , both economies are inhabited by a continuum of identical 
households that is normalized to one. The households are endowed with one unit of time 
that can only be allocated to work, so the labor input is equal to one. The countries 
produce a non-traded final good with two traded intermediate inputs. The final good can 
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be used for consumption and investment in physical capital. The factor inputs labor and 
capital are allocated to the production of intermediate goods. In addition, markets are 
competitive, international factor flows are not allowed and foreign and domestic 
intermediate goods are homogeneous. 
The non-traded final good, ( )iy t , is produced with the Cobb-Douglas technology: 




= ∈  (1) 
where ( )ix t  and ( )iz t  denote the total production of intermediate inputs. However, 
this notation will change appropriately in a trade situation. We purposely assume that 
input shares may be different in countries, i.e. B Pα α≠ . As shown by Yenokyan et al. 
(2014), dissimilar input intensities may impede the equalization of countries’ interest 
rates, so convergence in growth rates is not guaranteed. Henceforth, it is convenient to 
keep in mind that good x  is chosen as the numeraire. Thus, one unit of final good costs 
( )ip t  units of good x , while one unit of good z  costs ( )izp t  units of good x . 
We consider the following technologies for intermediate goods: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ )
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x t k t TP l t ,
0,1 , TP t T
t





∈ = > ∈
 (2) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1i i i izz t k t k t 1 l t ,ββ −= −  (3) 
where ( )ixk t  and ( )il t  denote capital and labor allocated to sector x , respectively, and 
( )izk t  and ( )i1 l t−  represent the amounts of factor inputs used in sector z .5 In sector x  
the variable ( )iTP t  represents labor-augmenting technological progress, with initial 
                                                 
5 For notational simplicity, the equilibrium condition of the labor market has been introduced. 
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value ( )iTP 0  and exogenous growth rate iθ . In sector z  productivity gains come from 
an external LBD process à la Arrow (1962) linked to capital per capita of the economy, 
( ) ( ) ( )i i ix zk t k t k t= + , and hence the technologies become of an AK type. The LBD 
process entails an engine of productivity gains that may allow country B to take 
advantage of trade gains in terms of growth. Since 0 B Pθ θ≤ < , in autarky country P 
enjoys a higher long-run growth rate than country B. We consider identical factor shares 
between countries and across sectors. This simplifying assumption allows us to identify 
β  and 1 β−  with aggregate capital and labor shares which, according to some of the 
empirical literature, do not differ much between countries (e.g. Gollin, 2002). 
Furthermore, in a trade situation country B sets an ad-valorem import tariff with tax 
rate 0τ ≥ , and distributes the tax revenues among the households in the form of lump 
sum transfers, ( )BT t 0≥ . 
Preferences are identical in both countries. The representative household derives 
utility from consumption, ( )ic t , and maximizes its intertemporal utility discounted at 
the rate ρ : 
 ( )
( )( )















−∫   (4) 
subject to the budget constraint: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i ia t r t a t w t T t p t c t ,≤ + + −   (5) 
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and the initial condition, ( )ia 0 0> . The variable ( )ia t 6 denotes wealth, ( )ir t  is the 
interest rate and ( )iw t  is the wage. Moreover, in a trade situation it holds that 
( )BT t 0≥  and ( )PT t 0= . 
III AUTARKY EQUILIBRIUM 
The maximization of profits in the final good sector implies that the prices of 
intermediate goods are equal to their respective values of marginal productivities. Thus, 
( )izp t  can be expressed in terms of the relative production of intermediate goods: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
       
i i i
i i i i i
i z i zi i i
i
y t y t x t11 p t , p t p t 1 p t .




= = − → =   (6) 
From the maximization of profits in the intermediate good sectors, interest rate and the 
wage can be written as: 
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β δ β δ= − + = − +
 
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x t z t
w t 1 1 p t ,
l t 1 l t
β β= − = −
−
  (8) 
where 0δ >  is the depreciation rate of capital. Moreover, the equation driving 
consumption through time comes from solving the household problem: 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( )







c t p t p t1 1r t r t 1 .
c t p t p t
ρ ρ α
σ σ
   
= − − = − − −      
   
  
  (9) 
In equation (9), it should be noted that, from (1) and (6), the price of the final good and 
that of good z  are related as ( )( ) ( )1  ii iz ip t A p t
α−
= , where ( ) ii 1i i iA 1
ααα α −≡ − . 
                                                 
6 In equilibrium the household’s wealth ( )ia t  will be equal to ( ) ( )i ip t k t . 
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The competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations and prices that satisfy firms and 
household problems, and clear all markets in the economy. The relative prices in (6) and 
the factor price equalization in (7) and (8) yield the factor allocation: 
 ( )







α= =   (10) 
Using equations (2), (3), (6) and (10), ( )izp t  can be expressed as: 









=   
 
 (11) 
Also, using equations (1), (2), (3), (6), (7) and (10) we can write the interest rates as: 
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After introducing (12) in the consumption growth rate in (9), we obtain: 
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− −

  (13) 
The long-run equilibrium is a balanced growth path (BGP) where the growth rate is 














  (14) 
As expected, there is a positive relationship between productivity gains in sector x  and 
the autarky relative price of good z . 
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IV THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE FOR GROWING THROUGH TRADE 
From the autarky prices in equation (14) it follows that country B could have 
comparative advantage in good z  or in good x . By solving the trade equilibrium in 
country B at exogenously given terms of trade, we show that growing through trade 
with country P is only possible when the former economy has comparative advantage in 
good z . The configuration of parameters under which country B has comparative 
advantage in either good z  or good x  will be determined in Section V. 
Comparative advantage in good z for country B 
Trade may allow country B to get rid of lower productivity gains in sector x  by 
importing good x . When this is the case, the final good production can be written as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )B B1B P BB By t x t z t
α α−
= , where ( )PBx t  is the imported production of good x  
(produced in country P and used in country B). From now on, when a variable that 
expresses a quantity of intermediate good is used, the superscript identifies the country 
in which the good is produced, and the subscript denotes the country in which it is 
employed. Thus, the amount of good z  used within country B is denoted as ( )BBz t , and 
hence the exported production is denoted as ( )BPz t . Since international capital flows are 
not allowed, the equilibrium in the trade balance implies that ( ) ( ) ( )P BB z Px t p t z t= , 
where the omission of the country superscript denotes international price. Moreover, the 
interest rate can be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
, ,B zB B DB z B
z
p t
r t A p 1
p t
α
β δ α= − + −

  (15) 
where ( ),B Dz zp p 1 τ≡ +  is the domestic relative price. After introducing the interest 
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= > >   (16) 
Equation (16) reveals that a growth increase will emerge from trade provided that 
country B enjoys a more favorable domestic relative price than in autarky. More 
noteworthy, under this specialization pattern, the terms of trade of country B are 
positively related to the partner’s growth rate, so faster foreign growth leads to higher 
interest rate and growth rate. However, an increase in the import tariff may impair 
domestic growth, unless country B can influence the international relative prices. This 
issue will be analyzed later on. 
Comparative advantage in good x for country B 
The final good production can be written as ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )B B1B B B PB By t x t z z t
α α−
= + , while 
the equilibrium in the trade balance is ( ) ( ) ( )B PP z Bx t p t z t= . Since the technologies 
exhibit constant returns to scale in reproducible variables –physical capital and labor-
augmenting technological progress–, the terms of trade of country B, i.e. ( )z1 p t , 
converge to a constant value in the long-run. Thus, the backward economy enjoys its 
own productivity gains in sector x  and hence grows at the same rate as in autarky: 










ϑ β δ ρ θ
σ
−
− −   = − − =     
  (17) 
where ( )B,Dz zp p 1 τ≡ +  is the domestic relative price of good z . 
V GROWTH-ENHANCING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE TRADE EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, we address four questions. We first identify the conditions for country B 
to have the growth-enhancing comparative advantage. Then, we characterize the trade 
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equilibrium under this specialization pattern. The trade equilibrium allows us to 
undertake the third task, namely, to study the potential impacts of trade on the long-run 
growth rate of country B. Lastly, we assess the long-run welfare effects of a tariff and 
hence the rationale for setting a tariff by country B. 
The comparative advantages of countries 
Figure 1 illustrates the determinants of comparative advantages, namely, input 
intensities and the growth rates of technological progress. The autarky price of country 
P as a function of Pα , ( )Pz P Pp , ,α θ ⋅ , is indicated with a solid line. The dashed/dotted 
line represents country B’s autarky price as a function of Bα , ( )Bz B Bp , ,α θ ⋅ . The 
functions reach a maximum at ( )maxi i1α σθ δ ρ β≡ − + + , which is smaller than one for 
empirically plausible parameter values. We set B Bα α=  , and so choose a particular 
value for country B’s autarky price, ( )Bz Bp α . Thus, we can define a threshold value 
( )P B P B, ,α α θ α⋅ <   such that ( ) ( )( )B Pz B z P B P Pp p , , , ,α α α θ θ= ⋅ ⋅  .7 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Consequently, the condition ( )P P B P, ,α α α θ< ⋅  implies that country B has 
comparative advantage in good x , while ( )P P B P, ,α α α θ> ⋅  leads to the opposite result. 
Moreover, faster growth in country P ( P Pθ θ>

) moves its autarky price upwards, 
                                                 
7 The autarky prices of countries might also coincide for a higher ( )P B P, ,α α θ ⋅ . We leave aside this 
possibility since it involves extreme values for Pα . For example, the parameter values in Table 1 (at the 
end of this section) yield maxB 0.74α =  and ( )B maxz Bp 0.35α = , with ( )P B maxz z Bp p α=  for .P 0 49α =  and 
.P 0 94α = . It is worth noting that if Pα  were greater than ( )P B P, ,α α θ ⋅ , then country B would have 
comparative advantage in good x  and hence would grow at the same rate as in autarky. 
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( )Pz P Pp , ,α θ ⋅

 (indicated with a dashed line), thus amplifying the range of values for Pα  
that allows country B to have comparative advantage in good z . Therefore, the growth-
enhancing comparative advantage is facilitated by faster growth of the partner’s 
economy. 
As previously mentioned, the growth-enhancing comparative advantage agrees with 
the empirical results in Trefler (1993). Indeed, the autarky prices in equation (11) 
depend on the capital-labor ratio of the economy, where labor is adjusted for the 
exogenous productivity increases in sector x . Thus, the condition ( ) ( )P Bz zp t p t>  
implies that country P, the advanced economy, exports the productivity-adjusted labor-
intensive good and imports the capital-intensive good, while the opposite applies to the 
backward economy. 
The trade equilibrium 
As commented earlier, country B will eventually be completely specialized in good z  
provided that ( )P P B P, ,α α α θ> ⋅ , since country P has absolute advantage in good x . 
Country P, however, may produce both goods (incomplete specialization), or just good 
x  (complete specialization), which relies on input intensities in the final good 
production of countries. 
The production of final good in country B has been indicated in Section IV, while 
country P’s can be written as ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )P P1P P P BP Py t x t z t z t
α α−
= + . The maximization 
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of profits in the final good sector of countries B and P and the equilibrium in the trade 
balance8 yield the equilibrium expression for the international relative price: 













  (18) 


















x t l t
,
x t l t
α−
=   (20) 
respectively. The interest rate of country B appears in (15), while the interest rate of 
country P comes from the equation (12) after removing the country superscript in the 
relative price of good z . The equalization of interest rates and wages between sectors of 
country P and the relative price in (18) yield the factor allocation in this economy: 
 ( )






k t k t
l t .
k t k t
α Ω= = +   (21) 
It is worth noting that under complete specialization of country P it holds that ( )Pl t 1=  
and hence ( ) ( ) ( )B PP Bk t 1 k tα Ω= − . 
                                                 


































The long-run growth rate of country B 
It is reasonable to assume that country B sets an import tariff on good x  that allows a 
growth increase in the long-run which, according to (16), requires that: 
 )         
P P B
B max maxz z z
z B
z




−> → ∈ ≡+
  (22) 
where a growth increase is obtained provided that the tariff rate is smaller than the 
maximum tariff maxτ . The growth possibilities of country B depend on whether or not 
trade leads to the equalization of interest rates between the countries. The interest rates, 
in turn, hinge on international and domestic relative prices. Thus, to study the growth 
potential outcomes of country B we rely on the trade equilibrium and also on the 
example depicted in Figure 2. Note that Bα is set equal to a particular value Bα , so we 
will write BA  and BΩ , instead of BA  and BΩ . In the figure, the autarky prices ( )Bz Bp α  
and ( )Pz Pp α  are denoted with dotted lines, while international and domestic relative 
prices zp  and ( )zp 1 τ+  are indicated with solid lines. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Let us first consider the trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization of the 
trading partner, where country B faces country P’s autarky price, i.e. Pz zp p= . As both 
economies produce good z  with an AK technology, the growth rates of countries P and 
B converge to: 
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
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  (24) 
respectively. For a better understanding of the results in equation (24), it is convenient 
to note that in a free trade (FT) equilibrium with no tariff the interest rates (growth 















   (25) 
However, since the tariff reduces the domestic price of country B, this equalization 
would require a higher Pα  ( P Bα̂ α>  ), which depends on the tariff size. The value Pα̂  
yields an international price ( ) FTz1 pτ+  and a domestic price FTzp . In this respect, it is 
worth noting that the required Pα̂  will not exist if 
max
B Pα α≥  and also when the tariff 
rate is high enough. 
Let us assume that P P Pˆα α α< < , so the autarky price of country P and the domestic 
price of country B are such that ( ) ( )B P P FTz z z zp p 1 p 1 pτ τ< + < < + . From equation (24) 
it follows that country B grows faster than in autarky, i.e. B Bϑ θ> , because its domestic 
price is higher than its autarky price. Nonetheless, country B would need a domestic 
price as FTzp  to converge in growth rate with the partner, so the backward economy 
grows more slowly than country P, i.e. B Pϑ θ< . Accordingly, the exported proportions 
by countries B and P in (19) and (20) asymptotically approach BΩ  and zero, 




Under incomplete specialization of country P, convergence in growth rates (interest 
rates) is only possible when P Pˆα α= . In this case, the factor allocation in country P 
would be equal to P B 1α Ω+ < , owing to the wage equalization between the countries.9 
Moreover, the exported proportions by countries B and P would be BΩ  and 
( )B P BΩ α Ω+  , respectively. 
The condition P Pˆα α=  may also lead to complete specialization of country P 
provided that P B 1α Ω+ ≥ . So does condition P Pˆα α> . Since there is a Cobb-Douglas 
technology in sector x , the capital stock of country P can be adjusted to enable the 
equalization of interest rates and hence of growth rates: 
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 = =   (26) 
 











  (27) 
The exported proportions by countries B and P become equal to BΩ  and P1 α− , 
respectively. 
Long-run welfare impacts as a rationale for an import tariff 
A question that must be addressed refers to the welfare impacts as a rationale for setting 
a tariff in this context. Noticeably, this possibility relies on country B’s capability of 
affecting the international relative prices. Indeed, country B is price-acceptant when the 
trading partner produces both goods, so an import tariff will harm its domestic growth 
                                                 
9 Note that ( ) ( )( ) ( )i izw t p t 1 k tβ= − , i B,P= , so ( ) ( )B Pk t k t= . 
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and welfare. However, under complete specialization the international prices come from 
the interplay between the countries, which yields convergence in growth rates. In this 
section, we will show that under the latter trading regime an import tariff may improve 
long-run welfare of country B, so there could be a rationale for such a policy. 
We analyze this possibility by evaluating the dynamic system that appears in 
Appendix A in the BGP, and computing long-run capital and the allocation of final 
output between consumption and gross investment. The variables in the dynamic system 
become constant in the long-run as they are divided by ( )PTP t . From now on, variables 
per efficiency unit will be denoted with a bar. 
The countries’ capital stocks in the BGP can be written as: 
 ( ) ( )( )
P P1 P
P P FT1 1
z z










  (28) 
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  (29) 
Moreover, consumption is equal to final output minus gross investment, 
i
gi : 
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The impact of a tariff on final output can be decomposed in an income effect and an 
accumulation effect. Firstly, holding capitals constant, the income effect gives rise to a 
permanent increase (decrease) of country B’s (country P’s) final output because of the 
lower exported (imported) proportion of good z , i.e. BΩ . In other words, country B can 
21 
 
import the same quantity of good x  in exchange for a smaller quantity of good z . 
Secondly, the tariff worsens the terms of trade of country P, which lowers its interest 
rate and hence capital accumulation and final output in both economies. A look at 
equations (28) and (30) reveal that the tariff reduces country P’s final output and gross 
investment by the same proportion, so this economy experiences a fall in consumption 
and welfare. By contrast, equations (29) and (31) show quite different results for 
country B. Indeed, final output decreases by a lower proportion than gross investment, 
so a tariff has an ambiguous effect on consumption. An increase in consumption could 
take place if the accumulation effect is weakened, which occurs when country P is 
highly intensive in good x , i.e. for high enough Pα . This is so because the interest rate 
of country P is barely affected by the terms of trade. Next, we explore this possibility 
through the numerical examples that appear in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We compute numerically the long-run values of capital, consumption, final output 
and international and domestic prices under free trade and with an import tariff of 10%. 
To do so, we consider the calibration for the US by Cooley and Prescott (1995), which 
provides us with reliable parameter values reflecting the actual behavior of an economy. 
In addition, we set B 0.45α =  and { }P 0.65,0.85α = . Consistent with our theoretical 
analysis, the tariff causes a greater decline in the countries’ capital stock and final 
output under P 0.65α =  than with P 0.85α = . Moreover, the former value yields a 
decrease in country B’s consumption, while an increase is obtained with the latter value. 
VI THE GROWTH IMPACTS OF FOREIGN GROWTH AND A DOMESTIC IMPORT TARIFF 
We have just shown that under incomplete specialization of the trading partner the long-
run growth rate of country B is affected by both foreign growth and a domestic import 
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tariff. In this section, we study the net impact of changes in these variables on domestic 
growth. Furthermore, under complete specialization the long-run growth rate of country 
B is affected by foreign growth, but unaffected by a domestic tariff. Even so, setting a 
tariff may have temporary growth and welfare impacts that we illustrate by computing 
numerically the transitional dynamics. 
The impacts of foreign growth and a tariff on domestic long-run growth 
Under incomplete specialization, the growth rate of country B in equation (24) depends 
on the domestic relative price of good z , which in turn depends on foreign growth (via 
the terms of trade) and the import tariff. To assess the relative growth impacts of 
changes in these two variables, we compute the percentage variation of country B’s 
domestic relative price in response to a percentage point change in the trading partner’s 
growth rate (foreign growth elasticity, , ,B Dz Pp θε ) and in the import tariff (tariff elasticity, 




































≡   (33) 
For ( )*P P P Pα α σθ σθ δ ρ≤ ≡ + + , the foreign growth effect is greater than the tariff 
effect provided that , ,B Dz Pp 1θε ≥ . Nonetheless, according to the calibrated parameter 
values in Table 1, this case involves the narrow value range * .P P 0 1304α α< = . For 
*
P Pα α> , the net impact relies on the tariff size: 
 
( )
     if     B ,D B ,D
z P z
* P




σθε ε τ τ
α σθ δ ρ σθ
> <
= = ≡
< > + + −
  (34) 
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Even so, we can establish a sufficient condition for the foreign growth effect to prevail 
over the tariff effect. More specifically,  > B ,D B ,D
z P zp , p ,θ τ
ε ε  if maxP P B Pα α α α< ≤ ≤  
because the threshold tariff *τ  is greater than the maximum tariff rate maxτ  defined in 
(22). Indeed, P Bα α=   and B 0θ =  yields 
* maxτ τ> . So does P Bα α<   and B 0θ >  
provided that both conditions reduce maxτ , while the former one increases *τ . 
By contrast, when the partner is completely specialized in good x  the growth rate of 
country B in equation (27) does not depend on the import tariff, and domestic and 
foreign growth rates exhibit a positive one-to-one relationship. It is also worth noting 
that, as illustrated in Figure 2, convergence in growth rates may take place in the 
presence of an import tariff and under free trade. In the former case, the domestic price 
is lower than the international price, ( )FT FTz zp 1 pτ< + , while in the latter, both countries 
face the international price FTzp . 
The short-run growth and welfare effects of a tariff 
Under incomplete specialization country B becomes negligible in terms of income, and 
eventually behaves as an AK economy facing constant terms of trade. By contrast, 
short-run effects can be sizeable when both countries are completely specialized. This 
issue is relevant because, although a tariff does not affect the long-run growth rate, it 
does have temporary growth and welfare impacts. For analyzing these impacts, we 
compute numerically the transitional dynamics in the neighborhood of the BGP using 
the parameter values in Table 1. The solution method is described in Appendix B. As 
shown in the appendix, the BGP is locally-saddle path stable. 
The numerical exercises are aimed at comparing the transitional dynamics when 
country B sets an import tariff of 10% with the dynamics under free trade. To do so, we 
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construct the time paths of ratios of value with a tariff over value under free trade. 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the ratios of capital, consumption and final output, and also the 
ratios of international and domestic relative prices of good z  for P 0.65α =  and 
P 0.85α = , respectively. We consider these two values for Pα  since, as shown in the 
previous section, they greatly affect capital accumulation and welfare. 
FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
The introduction of a tariff causes a permanent deterioration of country P’s terms of 
trade and a temporary decrease in the domestic price of country B, which reduces the 
interest rates and hence the incentives to accumulate capital. Consequently, the ratios of 
capital in both figures are lower than unity. Regarding final output, the figures show a 
decline in the ratios of both countries, which can be explained by the double effect of a 
tariff formerly studied. Both effects reduce country P’s final output, so the ratio of this 
economy is lower than unity. For country B, however, the effects go in opposite 
directions. Indeed, at the beginning of the transition, the ratio of country B is greater 
than unity since the income effect dominates over the accumulation effect. As the 
transition advances, the latter effect becomes increasingly important, thus causing a 
decline in final output of the backward economy. Moreover, Figure 4 shows smaller 
reductions in capital and final output than Figure 3. These results are consistent with our 
previous analysis showing that the accumulation effect is weakened when the partner’s 
economy is highly intensive in good x . All in all, the tariff impairs short-run growth in 
both countries. 
The response of consumption is also related to the effects of a tariff on final output. 
The ratio of country P is lower than unity in both figures, so this economy experiences a 
fall in consumption and welfare. In country B, however, the tariff has an ambiguous 
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impact on consumption. Indeed, the income effect entails a permanent increase in final 
output and consumption. Contrariwise, the accumulation effect reduces capital 
accumulation, output and consumption. The tariff becomes welfare-improving when the 
partner’s economy is highly intensive in good x , as long as this condition weakens the 
latter effect. Consistently, in Figure 3 the ratio of consumption of country B eventually 
becomes lower than unity, while in Figure 4 this ratio holds above unity throughout the 
transition. 
VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We have shown that pure Ricardian trade, in the absence of scale economies and 
international spillovers, can account for the empirical evidence that domestic growth is 
more affected by the trading partners’ growth rate than by trade openness. To do so, we 
have developed a two-country model based on Ventura’s (1997), where a backward 
economy may boost its long-run growth by trading in intermediate goods with a faster 
growing partner. In addition, the backward economy sets an import tariff that could 
never be growth-enhancing. The model captures three significant empirical facts, 
namely, world trade flows are largely of intermediate goods, these goods play a crucial 
role in the trade-productivity-growth connection, and trade impacts growth mainly via 
capital investment. 
Owing to the countries’ differences in technology, the model can deliver any growth 
outcome in the backward economy, ranging from autarky growth to convergence in 
growth rate with the trading partner. We have obtained that growing through trade 
requires having comparative advantage in a sector with learning opportunities, which is 
facilitated by a higher growth rate of the partner. Moreover, this comparative advantage 
is consistent with the well-known Leontief paradox. Under the growth-enhancing 
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comparative advantage, growth acceleration in the partner’s economy always increases 
domestic growth, which is consistent with empirical findings. This is so because faster 
foreign growth improves the backward economy’s terms of trade, which boosts capital 
accumulation. 
The net impact of changes in foreign growth and a tariff on domestic growth depends 
on the specialization regime of the partner. Under incomplete specialization, the 
backward economy grows more slowly than the partner, and its growth rate is 
negatively affected by a tariff, since this economy cannot influence international prices. 
Even so, we have identified a sufficient condition for the foreign growth effect to 
prevail over the tariff effect. By contrast, under complete specialization, there is 
equalization of countries’ growth rates, and the domestic relative price of the backward 
economy does not depend on the tariff. Consequently, convergence in growth rates can 
take place with an import tariff and under free trade. Furthermore, under this 
specialization regime there may be a rationale for setting a tariff, since this policy could 
be welfare-enhancing for the backward economy. Yet, a tariff impairs short-run growth 
of both countries because of its negative impact on capital accumulation. 
In line with Arora and Vamvakidis (2005), we conclude that understanding the trade-
growth linkage requires going beyond domestic conditions, such as the degree of 
openness. Indeed, we have shown that domestic growth can rely more on foreign 
growth than on a domestic import tariff, even under a pure Ricardian approach. Further 
analysis is certainly needed on the role of foreign and domestic conditions in the trade-
growth connection. In this sense, our model can be extended in several directions, such 
as considering a multi-country framework, tariffs in all countries or endogenous growth. 




We are indebted with two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions that 
have greatly improved our paper. Carmen D. Álvarez-Albelo acknowledges financial 
support from Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2013-48884-C3-
3-P). Antonio Manresa acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness (ECO 2012-34046 and ECO 2013-41917-P) and 
Generalitat de Catalunya (2014 SGR-493 and XREAP2015-308149). 
APPENDIX A: DYNAMIC SYSTEM UNDER COMPLETE SPECIALIZATION 
Considering B 0θ = , both countries will be completely specialized provided that: 
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      (A1) 
In the computation of the transitional dynamics, we assume that ( ) ( )P Bk 0 k 0= . The 
initial values of technological progress can be then adjusted to ensure complete 
specialization of both economies throughout the transition. 
The dynamic system driving the time evolution of the two-country economy is 
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  (A5) 
where variables with a bar are expressed in terms of efficiency units of labor in sector 
x , i.e. divided by ( )PTP t , so they become constant in the BGP. 
APPENDIX B: SOLUTION TO THE LINEARIZED DYNAMIC SYSTEM UNDER COMPLETE 
SPECIALIZATION 
To construct Figures 3 and 4, we linearize the dynamic system defined in Appendix A 
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After finding eigenvalues jλ  and corresponding eigenvectors jv  of the Jacobian matrix, 
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       (B2) 
where jb  are the constants of integration, which are determined by the values at t 0= . 
The BGP is locally saddle-path stable in the four cases computed. Indeed, the 
eigenvalues belong to real numbers; there are two negative eigenvalues, 1λ  and 2λ , and 
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two positive eigenvalues, 3λ  and 4λ . Thus, we set 3 4b b 0= = , and the constants of 
integration 1b  and 2b  come from solving the system of equations: 
( ) ( )    P P B B31 1 32 2 41 1 42 2k 0 k v b v b , k 0 k v b v b .− = + − = +       (B3) 
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Long-run impacts of a tariff under complete specialization: Numerical examples 
Parameter values 
Preferences: 1σ = , 0.056ρ =  (Cooley and Prescott, 1995) 
Technology: 0.4β = , 0.048δ = , P 0.0156θ =  (Cooley and Prescott, 1995), B 0.45α =  
Long-run equilibrium 




0.0 4.9834 4.6873 1.1731 1.1034 1.4900 1.4015 0.3155 0.3155 
0.1 4.7139 4.3966 1.1097 1.0910 1.4095 1.3707 0.3470 0.3155 
% Var. -5.41 -6.20 -5.41 -1.12 -5.41 -2.20 10.00 0.00 
0.85 
0.0 4.9338 2.0008 1.1614 0.4709 1.4752 0.5982 0.3155 0.3155 
0.1 4.8176 1.9007 1.1341 0.4717 1.4405 0.5926 0.3470 0.3155 
% Var. -2.35 -5.00 -2.35 0.15 -2.35 -0.95 10.00 0.00 
Note: % Var. refers to percentage variation. 
 
